Security Implications of 3rd Party Resources in WWW


Kārlis Podiņš

Outline

- Cross-site scripting (XSS) attack on web 2.0
- Defeats active content blockers (e.g. NoScript)
 - because of use of external resources in web pages
- Large-scale scanning to examine use of Content Security Policy in web pages

Method

- Review known phenomena in new circumstances
- Reasoning
 - Security often silo'ed
 - Study interaction for real-life performance



External content in WWW

- You don't load a webpage, you load the internet
- >90% of TOP 1M pages use external content
 - When visiting example.com:
 - Internal = something.example.com
 - External = awesomecdn.lol
- Breakup by [Kumar]
 - Tracking 75.4%,
 - CDN 65.2%,
 - API 39%,
 - Advertising 42.2%,
 - Social media 39.7%

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	Temporarily allow 0914.global.ssl.fastly.net Allow 0914.global.ssl.fastly.net
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5	Temporarily allow sharethrough.com
in	Allow sharethrough.com
	Temporarily allow quantserve.com
S	Allow quantserve.com
S	Forbid turner.com
S	Temporarily allow chartbeat.com
-	

Old Teaching

From: gmail
Subject: change your password
Body: Somebody has your password, change it ASAP at google-security.com

- For 10+ years:
 - Updates
 - Check what you click
 - google-something.com is bad
 - Use NoScript
- Users slowly starting to get it

New Teaching

- fbcdn.com
- ssl-images-amazon.com
- akamaihd.net
- delphi.lv
- itvnet.lv





Father of all* cyber attacks

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

- Data interpreted as code
 - Von Neumann architecture
- Subclass of code injection attacks
 - HTML injection
- Enter comment:
 - <script>alert("Pwned")</script>

XSS

- P a benign web page
 - vulnerable to XSS
- P contains user input
 - in backend database (stored XSS)
 - or volatile stored in URL only (transient XSS)
- User input contains JavaScript
- Best practice defence against XSS is web server output sanitizing[owasp]
 - all user-supplied input could be validated before storing

XSS – direct vs indirect

- Direct attack
 - Attacker's script can be reliably stored and retrieved from backend database
 - = full control
 - exploitation of external resources unnecessary
 - Visiting page P equals to visiting a rogue page
 - Challanges (from attacker viewpoint)
 - storage limit insufficient
 - all attack scripts on victim's server = faster incident response
- Indirect attack
 - To overcome challanges, attackers usually store their scripts on external resources

XSS vs NoScript

•NoScript – browser plugin for restricting domains for active content

- •P legacy web page
 - -NoScript reliably helps
 - -User enables scripts from domain P
 - Simple dynamic content, in-site navigation, search etc
 - Allows initial attacker's scripts to execute

 Attacker's secondary scripts stored on external domains blocked
 Unless user allows scripts from evil.com
- •P typical modern web page
 - -Heavy use of external resources
 - -Some external resources are required for basic functionality
 - User has to allow execution of scripts from some domains
 - -Black-box model
 - No clear naming policy
 - Attacker can register any available domain name
 - -Race condition
 - -User allows domains in random pattern
 - •User likely to allow to enable execution of attacker's scripts


NoScript vs External Resources

- P uses resources from commercial 3rd party C
 - attacker can purchase service from C too
 - Bitcoin
 - Stolen CC
 - Demo period
 - Depending on policy used by C, legitimate resources of P and malicious resources are not easily distinguishable by either user or security software
- Service provider policy
 - Subdomains
 - N2435PORIUaASOPI.awesomecdn.lol
 - Path
 - awesomecdn.lol/po2i43r5a0ou2

Content Security Policy (CSP)


- Mitigate XSS
- Explicitly defined in HTTP header
- Report functionality!
- Cannot restrict path
 - awesomecdn.lol/naou21rass
- Useless CSP
 - *.awesomecdn.lol

Model




Script executed only if Script O URIofScript O Domain ε webPage O CSP O domain Or explicit script

Good CSP



Bad CSP



Large-scale examination of CSP

- Dataset Alexa Top 1M
- 98% don't give a damn
- 4% of CSPs vulnerable
 - 1/25 fail
 - $\sim 1/1000$ of total

Results

- amazonaws.com
- cloudfront.net
- akamaihd.net • 152
- s3.amazonaws.com • 21
- githubusercontent.com • 31
- rackcdn.com • 16
- edgecastcdn.net • 11
- kxcdn.com • 11
- akamaized.net • 10
- edgesuite.net • 8

- 310
- 200

Take-away

- Revisit advice given to users
 - Circumstances change
- Review naming policies
 - Single domain possible e.g. youtube
 - TODO youtube is single purpose cdn, special case
- Script-free fallback functionality
 - Breaks income model
 - TODO unintended consequences?
 - income model --> insecure users
- CSP implementation careful examination

